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Light Division/Cavalry
and
Low-Intensity Conflict Reconnaissance

A Monograph
by

Major John M. Stawasz



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Abstract

LIGHT DIVISIONAL CAVALRY AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT RECONNAISSANCE by MAJ John M. Stawasz, USA, 49 pages.

This monograph discusses the need for the light infantry division to have a divisional cavalry squadron to collect information for operations in a low-intensity conflict.

Although the light division is considered to be the best force to employ in a low-intensity conflict, its austere structure limits its ability to complete all low-intensity conflict operations. Analysis shows that the light infantry division is most suited for conducting counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation, and peacekeeping operations. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is currently the primary form of information available to the light infantry division when conducting these operations. The information collection requirements for these operations can be defined by using the 25th Infantry Division's S2 Guide to a Low Intensity Conflict.

The light infantry division has two organizations specifically designed to collect HUMINT information; the military intelligence battalion and the cavalry squadron. The nine light infantry battalions can also collect this information. Each of these units have specific capabilities. The division can best collect information by the combined efforts of the military intelligence battalion's long range surveillance detachment (LRSD) and interrogation teams, the cavalry squadron's two air troops and one ground troop, and the light infantry battalions.

Because of the need to collect information with aerial and ground assets, the division needs a cavalry squadron for operations in a low-intensity conflict.

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Part I: Introduction

During the 1980s, the Army developed and fielded the light infantry divisions as rapidly deployable forces for worldwide low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations.(1) However, because of competing force requirements, these divisions soon gained roles as mid-intensity conflict forces. During combined exercises, such as REFORGER in Germany, and TEAM SPIRIT in the Republic of Korea, the light infantry divisions demonstrated their ability to fight in a mid-intensity conflict. This capability caused a focus on the role of the light division in conducting operations against a conventional opponent. For example, investigations by David Gates, a noted British historian and defense analyst,(2) and US Army Colonel Huba Wass de Czege,(3) determined that the light infantry division was well-suited for conventional combat in Europe against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

However, the changing world situation and decline of the Soviet Union have refocused attention on the need for the United States to retain a force projection capability to be prepared to safeguard its national interests anywhere in the world.(4) One of these requirements is to conduct low-intensity conflict operations. As a result, the light infantry division may once again be needed to complete its original low-intensity conflict mission.

The Army's most recent field manual on division operations, FM 71-100, Division Operations, devotes only one appendix, of seventeen pages, to divisional low-intensity conflict operations. This appendix's only entry on the light infantry division states that this type division, "is the most appropriate force in the US divisional structure to conduct combat operations in LIC."(5)

Using this entry in FM 71-100 as a starting point, this monograph will ultimately determine if the light infantry division requires a divisional cavalry squadron to collect information in a low-intensity conflict. The first step is to investigate the organization of the light infantry division to determine the division's capabilities and limitations in completing low-intensity conflict operations. The method is to use the battlefield operating systems, described in the "Blueprint for the Tactical Level of War", as a framework for analysis.(6) Since the monograph's purpose is to determine the need for a divisional cavalry squadron, it focuses on the information collecting capabilities of the division. These capabilities have been primarily designed into the organization of the military intelligence battalion and the divisional cavalry squadron. In addition, there is also a limited collection capability with the division's nine light infantry battalions.

The monograph then develops the possible missions the light infantry division may be ordered to complete by following the evolution of the US Army's concept of low-intensity conflict and its redefinition into operations short of war. The four categories of these operations are insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations.(7) These operations are analyzed to determine what operations the light division is most suited to complete by comparing the mission requirements of each possible operation against the capabilities and limitations of the division. The operations that the division is not suited to complete are set aside and will not be further analyzed.

Next, the monograph determines the information requirements for the remaining suitable operations based on the modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield process developed in the 25th Infantry Division's S2 Guide to a Low Intensity Conflict.(8) Using this process, it determines which organization, or combination of organizations, can best collect the necessary information for the division to succeed in operations short of war. The monograph concludes by determining the need for a light divisional cavalry squadron for collecting information for operations in a low-intensity conflict.

Part II: The Light Infantry Division

Light infantry divisions were developed in the mid-1980s in response to Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham's analysis of the world situation. He believed that the United States' current military force structure did not have the strategic flexibility to fight in situations such as the Falkland Islands or Lebanon. The light infantry division was designed to provide the Army with a strategically-mobile combat force that could rapidly deploy.(9) It was considered to be the organization most suited to low-intensity conflict operations since it could get to the location of conflict quickly.(10) Once in the theater of operations, its purpose was to fight comparable forces in most types of terrain--such as jungles, mountainous regions, and urban areas--and in all types of weather. It would usually conduct missions at night or during periods of limited visibility.(11) Its anticipated opponents included conventional light infantry units as well as the irregular, or unconventional, light infantry-type forces normally confronted in a low-intensity conflict operation.(12)

The capabilities of the current light infantry division are derived directly from its austere force structure. Its organization is similar to the other Army divisions organized under the "Army of Excellence" concept. However, the light division does not have the large number

of vehicles and heavy equipment found in most Army divisions. It achieves its relative "lightness" by having less manpower and equipment per unit. It was as if the force planners took a current division structure and pared away items and personnel that were considered to be redundant. The impetus for this structure appears to be the requirement of having a division-level organization of ten thousand soldiers that could be strategically moved by the equivalent of five hundred C-141b aircraft sorties.(13)

The division does not have a "forced-entry" capability since it was designed to be moved with as few aircraft sorties as possible. This means its destination airfield in the area of operations must be secured by either previously committed United States forces, other allied military forces, or the local host nation. Implicit in this is the requirement for at least local air superiority to protect the division as it enters and lands in theater.(14) As will be discussed later, the lack of this capability impacts on the division's suitability for conducting certain operations.

An analysis of the light division's capabilities, once in its area of operations, can be done using the Army's "Blueprint for the Tactical Level of War." This blueprint is organized into seven battlefield operating systems which define the major functions that the division must accomplish to successfully complete its mission.(15) This

monograph uses four of the seven battlefield operating systems as criteria to analyze the capabilities and limitations of the light division when conducting operations. The systems used are: combat service support, mobility and survivability, maneuver, and intelligence. The three remaining systems, air defense, fire support, and command and control are not used since they do not impact on the monograph's analysis of information collection in low-intensity conflict operations. Following this analysis, we will take the division's capabilities and in the next part of the monograph, compare them with the mission requirements for each of the four categories of operations short of war to determine suitable operations for the division in low-intensity conflict.

The first battlefield operating system is combat service support, or logistics. Its the functions are "manning, arming, fueling, fixing, distribution, (and) providing sustainment engineering." (16) The light infantry division's support command is organized, like other divisions, with a main support battalion and three forward support battalions, but is designed to sustain the division for only up to 48 hours of operation. (17) Because of the aircraft sortie limitation, the light infantry division's support command relies on augmentation from corps or army level to sustain the division for longer periods. These augmentation forces, commonly referred to as "plugs," are

chemical decontamination units; troop service units such as laundry, bath and clothing exchange; aviation and truck transportation units; and medical, hospital and ambulance units. The division also requires additional material handling equipment to move its supplies. Each of these augmentations is tailored to support the light infantry division based upon the current operation's mission requirements.(18) These combat service support limitations have an impact on the division's capability to complete certain operations. This impact will be discussed later in the monograph.

The requirement for strategic mobility also makes the light division a primarily foot-mobile force. Its organic transportation capability is extremely limited, and the simultaneous use of the division's two helicopter assault companies and its truck company can move the combat elements of just two light infantry battalions. The remainder of the division's infantry battalions must either march or be shuttled into the area of operations, unless the division receives additional transport.(19) As we will see later, this could impact on the division's ability to conduct infantry reconnaissance missions or complete certain operations.

The next system, mobility and survivability, includes functions "for enhancing friendly force movement... and protection from the effects of enemy weapons and natural occurrences."(20). Since the

light infantry division has few vehicles, and is offensively oriented against a similar opponent, it has a limited engineer capability. The division engineers mostly provide technical expertise for mobility and countermobility support. They have a reduced construction capability since the battalion has only eighteen small emplacement excavators and six M9 armored combat earthmovers for the division's survivability requirements.(21) This limitation has an impact on the division's ability to complete operations requiring a substantial engineering effort, as will be discussed later in the monograph.

The third system, maneuver, has three functions: "Move" is positioning the force and using terrain to gain advantage over the opponent; "Engaging the enemy" simply means fighting; "Controlling terrain" means denying the enemy use of terrain by occupying it, or covering it by direct fire.(22) Once in its area of operations, the light division maneuvers by operating throughout a large sector, with its subordinate units conducting widely dispersed, but synchronized, small unit actions to achieve the division's objectives.(23)

An important feature of the light infantry division is its high ratio of combat soldiers to support soldiers. The division's maneuver strength is its nine light infantry battalions of 561 men each, organized into three light infantry brigades. Each of these battalions can field three light infantry companies manned with infantry

soldiers who are highly trained and physically fit, and the division capitalizes on the flexibility and initiative of the leaders and soldiers of these companies. According to current concepts for the employment of the light infantry battalion, the combat power of these soldiers is maximized during offensive operations in rugged terrain, or periods of darkness or limited visibility.(24) This makes the light infantry division useful in the special environments such as mountains, jungles, and urban areas, all of which are common to operations in low-intensity conflict.(25)

The last battlefield operating system used for analysis-- intelligence, collects information on the enemy, weather and terrain.(26) The light division has two organizations specifically designed to collect tactical information: the military intelligence battalion and the divisional cavalry squadron. In addition, each light infantry battalion can be tasked to collect information.

The first intelligence collecting organization, the military intelligence battalion, Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI), was originally designed to be a company-sized element within the division cavalry squadron. However, as its functions and responsibilities increased, it was removed from the cavalry squadron and expanded to a separate battalion-sized element.(27) The battalion usually task-organizes to form company-team size

elements to support the infantry brigades in their areas of operation. These teams are composed of various types of information collectors.

Human intelligence, or HUMINT, collection is the primary information requirement in low-intensity conflict operations.(28) It is collected by numerous sources including prisoner interrogations done by interrogation teams from the intelligence and surveillance company and document analysis by the intelligence staff. Other units in the division conduct patrols and establish observation and listening posts to support HUMINT collection. The battalion also deploys four teams from the long range surveillance detachment (LRSD) to gather information. Each of these teams is composed of six, highly trained soldiers that make the LRSD the best HUMINT collector in the division. The division G2 intelligence staff officer tasks the detachment to conduct passive surveillance to observe and report on critical facilities, activities, terrain and weather throughout the division area of operations.(29)

Imagery intelligence, or IMINT, is produced by the ground surveillance radar (GSR) sections from the intelligence and surveillance company. These systems can cover trails, open areas or waterways. They can also reinforce the accuracy of information being collected by remote sensors or night vision devices.(30) The remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems (REMBASS) are placed

along trails and secondary routes of movements. These systems allow the battalion to collect information without using patrols, observations posts or other collectors which frees manpower to complete other operations.(31)

Communications intelligence, or COMINT, is produced by analyzing, integrating and interpreting information collected by the voice collection platoon of the battalion's collection and jamming company. The three EH-60 Blackhawk QUICKFIX helicopters assigned to the division's aviation brigade also provide direction finding, voice intercept collection, and a limited jamming capability.(32) The use of COMINT collectors is currently not as critical as HUMINT collection because of the relatively unsophisticated opponents expected to be confronted in a low-intensity operation.

The second intelligence collecting asset in the light division is the divisional cavalry squadron. The cavalry squadron is designed and equipped to perform security and reconnaissance missions in support of the light division. It is capable of conducting zone, area, and route reconnaissance missions. The light squadron, however, lacks the armored protection and firepower usually associated with cavalry. Consequently, it relies on stealth, skill and technology to perform its mission.(33)

The squadron's function is to "observe and report enemy dispositions, facilities and activities, as well as battlefield conditions." (34) It is capable of all-weather, day or night operations to collect HUMINT information. The squadron provides information on battlefield terrain conditions including obstacles, road trafficability, helicopter landing zones and locations for future division assembly areas. The squadron is also capable of providing limited information on the local population, primarily in terms of numbers, locations, and general activities. (35)

The squadron has two air troops, each equipped with six OH-58 observation helicopters and four AH-1 attack helicopters, that can complete day or night aerial reconnaissance. The air troops can maintain continuous observation by establishing an aircraft rotation plan. (36) As the French found in Indochina with the L-19 "Bird Dog" spotter aircraft of World War Two vintage, aerial reconnaissance is invaluable for collecting information. (37) During the Vietnam War, the US Army developed air cavalry units, such as the "Headhunters" of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, that used helicopters to complete rapid and wide-ranging reconnaissance. (38) The Soviets discovered in Afghanistan that aerial reconnaissance assets could investigate large areas in a single mission. (39)

However, there are limitations to aerial observation. The air crews of the cavalry squadron use aircraft sight systems, binoculars or the naked eye to complete daytime missions. They are more limited in completing night operations. The AH-1 attack helicopter's capabilities are severely degraded at night because of its daylight-only primary sight. The pilots of the OH-58 observation helicopter fly with night vision goggles that limit their ability to both fly the helicopter and search.(40) In addition, all information is subject to interpretation by the crew before it is reported to the intelligence staff.(41) Lastly one must consider Soviet General Triandafillov's comment on aerial reconnaissance. He believed that, "the fact that a flight takes off does not signify that it will see what needs to be seen."(42)

The squadron has one ground cavalry troop, equipped with high mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), that is able to partially compensate for the squadron's limited aerial reconnaissance capability. This troop was designed with two scout platoons with six M1025 HMMWVs, each armed with either the M60 or M2 machinegun, and two TOW platoons with four M966 HMMWVs, armed with the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missile and M60 machinegun. The troop usually organizes into four platoon teams of three scout vehicles and two TOW vehicles. This allows

each platoon to have two TOW thermal night sights to complete limited visibility reconnaissance missions. In addition, each vehicle is equipped with two PVS-5 series night vision goggles. These allow the platoon to move at night, man up to twenty observation or listening posts and conduct patrols with the increased observation provided by these goggles.(43) However, the ground troop is usually road bound because of its HMMWVs. Additionally, there are only three crew members on a vehicle. This means that if a platoon is to man its vehicles to provide security for the dismounted element, then only five scouts from the platoon can be dismounted to perform the reconnaissance.(44)

Each of the nine infantry battalions is also capable of conducting reconnaissance, using its organic scout platoon, composed of nineteen infantry scouts, or tasking the infantry companies to conduct patrols.(45) Infantry patrols would be especially useful in urban areas, mountains or heavily vegetated regions where vehicles could not travel or in areas that aerial reconnaissance could not be completed. However, the light infantry battalion's primary focus is on the conduct of tactical operations as part of its brigade. Tasking a brigade asset to complete divisional information requirements may deny the brigade the capability to complete its own mission before exhausting its resources. In addition, the light infantry units would

require transportation assets to move them quickly if they had to be moved for any great distance to complete the mission. Even so, the battalions may need to be tasked to collect information for the division if no other asset is capable of collecting the necessary information.

In summary, once in its area of operations, the light infantry division is an austere organization with unique capabilities and limitations that affect its ability to complete certain operations. Its high ratio of foot-mobile infantry soldiers allows the division to fight in most types of terrain and weather against a comparable opponent. Its division-level information collecting organizations, the military intelligence battalion and the division cavalry squadron are best focused on collecting HUMINT information. The division relies on combat service support augmentation to operate for longer than 48 hours, and a lack of engineers and equipment hinders its abilities to conduct extensive engineering missions. Each of these capabilities and limitations impact on the division's ability to complete operations in a low-intensity conflict.

Part III: Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict

Having determined some of the capabilities and limitations of the light division, the next step is to define the division's suitable

operations in a low-intensity conflict, including clarification of the parameters for that level of war.

Low-intensity conflict was originally a portion of the spectrum of conflict model of war and peace, and as such was the lower end of a spectrum of violence which stretched from routine peaceful competition, through conventional mid-intensity conflict, to war waged with unrestricted nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. The 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations described low-intensity conflict as an endless threat to the interests of the United States that did not require the overt recognition of a state of hostilities. A force designated to fight in such an environment would need to rapidly deploy to its area of operations to fight against an irregular, or unconventional enemy, while following strictly defined rules of engagement that would restrain the use of force in accomplishing military objectives. The primary mission of the force would be to stabilize a situation before it deteriorated and required more resources to resolve, with the overall objective of enforcing a return to the pre-hostility level of peaceful competition. Throughout the military operation, the political and economic elements of national power have primary emphasis in resolving problems at the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum.(46)

In 1990, the Army and Air Force released FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict to provide guidance for planning and coordinating the use of military force in low-intensity operations. An important purpose of this manual was to more precisely define low-intensity conflict and reduce the American misperception of low-intensity conflict as being less intensive than other military operations. It made clear that the threat to people involved in low-intensity conflict is just as immediate and threatening as to those involved in either mid- or high-intensity operations. The objective for military forces was to establish the conditions under which the nonmilitary forces could accomplish the strategic aims of the United States. The key point was that the application of military force supported the use of political, informational, and economic elements of national power instead of being the primary focus. This meant that a low-intensity conflict could often be a protracted struggle between competing political principles and ideologies rather than only a clash between armed forces. Conflicts of this sort would usually occur in third world countries as an intrastate conflict, however, any actions taken during this conflict could have implications for both regional and global security.(47)

In August 1991, the Army released TRADOC PAM 525-5, Airland Operations, the operational concept for the use of the strategic army of the future. It contains a new model describing the operational continuum that redefines low-intensity conflict as operations short of war. The routine, or base line, state of the continuum is peaceful competition, which ascends to a level of hostilities called the state of conflict, which, in turn, ascends to the state of war. Operations short of war span the continuum across peacetime competition and conflict.(48) The purpose of these operations is to deter conflict and prevent war by using military force to assist other nations in providing for their own security, stability and order. Instead of being solely an Army mission, most operations will be joint, combined, and conducted with other government agencies. These other agencies will most likely provide the direction and guidance for such an operation, with the Army's primary objective to provide materials, support services, technical advice, and training for the national forces of the host government. Only in rare instances will Army forces be involved in combat.(49)

A summary of Army concepts shows that a military force involved in an operation short of war could complete a broad variety of missions while placed in a situation that requires strict observance of restrictive rules of engagement. It could also rapidly change types

of missions depending on the current situation, however the overriding consideration throughout any of these operations is that the military is not used as the primary element of national power. In every instance, military force is used to enhance the use of political, informational, or economic power to achieve the interests of the United States.

Based on this short summary and the division's capabilities and limitations, we will analyze the light division's ability to complete operations short of war. These are divided into the four general categories of insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, and contingency operations.(50) The last category, contingency operations, has a wide variety of short duration missions that involve rapidly deploying a military force to defuse or stabilize a crisis situation to support the United States's interests.(51)

As we will find, the light infantry division is best suited to complete counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and noncombatant evacuation operations. It can also complete counterdrug support and shows of force, such as combined exercises, but for differing reasons we will not include them in our further analysis of the need for a divisional cavalry squadron. The light division is not the optimal force to use for supporting insurgencies, combatting terrorism,

surging the current assistance program, disaster relief, rescue and recovery operations, and strikes or raids. The light division could complete these operations, but it is not best suited for them because of organization, equipment or training limitations. These operations will also be set aside.

The first operation suitable for the light infantry division, military operations in a counterinsurgency, supports an existing government with materiel and training assistance to its police and security forces in operations against an internal opponent. These operations may also include the introduction of United States combat forces to help stabilize the situation and provide a higher degree of security to key installations and government programs.(52) Military operations conducted by the British in Malaya indicate that offensive missions designed to locate and destroy insurgent base camps and supply sources are the best way to eliminate an insurgency. This allows the government to maintain control of the situation, while correcting political, economic, and social deficiencies to retain the population's support.(53) Because of their strategic deployability and high ratio of infantry soldiers, the light division is suitable for conducting these missions against a comparable opponent in most types of terrain.

The next suitable operation, peacekeeping, is designed to maintain a negotiated peace or ceasefire to provide the stability to implement a political solution that will result in a return to peacetime competition. This operation may also include supervising the withdrawal or disengagement of military and civilian opposing forces.(54) Military forces may be part of a multinational peacekeeping force that also contributes to achieving the regional goals of the United States. An example of this type of peacekeeping operation is the use of United States Marines in Lebanon in 1983. During this operation, the Marines not only were part of a combined peacekeeping force, but also supported Lebanese government forces by artillery fire in attempt to further the acceptance of President Reagan's peace proposal for the Middle East.(55)

Military forces support peacekeeping operations by conducting patrols and surveillance, investigating complaints, gathering information, providing security to key installations, and generally monitoring the overall situation. Since they require acceptance by all belligerent groups, and usually have freedom of movement throughout the area; they operate under strict rules of engagement. However, the peacekeeping force never relinquishes the right to defend itself.(56) Because of their strategic mobility and large number of infantry soldiers, the light division is suited for peacekeeping operations. An

example of the use of a light infantry division as a basis for a peacekeeping force was the proposed task force of fifteen thousand soldiers for the 1982 crisis in Lebanon.(57)

The third suitable operation, noncombatant evacuation, is a contingency operation that protects the lives of United States citizens and other foreign nationals by removing them from the scene of potential conflict. An evacuation operation involves securing a departure airfield or port, locating the noncombatant evacuees, and safeguarding their withdrawal to the departure area. A military force may conduct these operations with or without the cooperation or approval of the host country.(58) The light infantry division is suited for noncombatant evacuation operations, done in cooperation with a friendly government, because of its strategic mobility and many foot-mobile soldiers available to assist in the evacuation. The 25th Infantry Division (Light) currently trains to conduct evacuation operations for contingencies throughout the Pacific Command area.(59) The light division is not suited for operations done without the cooperation of the local governments because it lacks a forced-entry capability, but it could be a follow on force once an initial arrival area has been secured.

Shows of force and demonstrations, also contingency operations, support United States interests by showing other political groups

that the United States has the capability to use force, if necessary, to safeguard its interests in the region.(60) Examples of these operations are: aircraft and naval visits; combined training exercises, such as TEAM SPIRIT; the forward stationing of armed forces, such as in Germany and Korea; and the deployment of armed forces into a new area, such as in Central America. The light division is suited for shows of force because of its strategic deployability. The 25th, 7th, and 6th Infantry Divisions (Light) all participated in TEAM SPIRIT exercises in the Republic of Korea.(61) However, shows of force will not be considered for analysis since the exercise's purpose is usually outside the scope of low-intensity conflict. For example, the TEAM SPIRIT exercise simulates a mid-intensity conflict between the allied forces and an invader. The COBRA GOLD exercise simulates a conventional defense of Thailand.(62)

A contingency operation of increasing national concern that will not be considered for further analysis is counterdrug operations. Military forces can support U.S. civil authorities such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol, or Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as local or regional authorities. Military forces usually provide advisors, training teams, intelligence products and logistics support, while operating inside the guidelines of the Posse Comitatus Act and other applicable federal and state laws.(63)

An example of a counterdrug operation internal to the United States is the aviation and manpower support given to the Drug Enforcement Agency by the 25th Infantry Division (Light) in destroying illegal marijuana crops in Hawaii.(64)

Military forces can also complete operations in foreign countries under the control of the unified commander. An example of a counterdrug operation in a foreign country is the use of Army aviation and intelligence units in Operation BLAST FURNACE in Bolivia.(65)

The light division could contribute manpower and aviation support to eradicate or collect the illegal drugs. In addition, it could provide soldiers and equipment to conduct surveillance of suspected routes and assist the local law enforcement agencies. However, since the division supports another agency with selected assets, and is not the controlling headquarters, counterdrug operations will not be considered in the analysis of the information needs of the division.

The first operation that we find the light division unsuitable for is support to insurgencies. These are organized struggles that use political resources, propaganda and violence against the current government. An insurgency can be protracted and may use both conventional and unconventional forces or terrorism to achieve its goal.(66) The US Army could support an insurgency by providing training cadres, intelligence, supplies and materials to improve the

capabilities of the insurgent force.(67) However, the Department of Defense is limited in supporting insurgencies by Executive Order 12333. This order directs the Central Intelligence Agency, except in times of war, or as allowed by the War Powers Resolution, to be the primary supporter of insurgency operations. According to the 1988 version of JCS PUB 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, most support to an insurgency will be covert support, with Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the optimal forces to conduct insurgency support because of their force structure and capabilities.(68) Therefore we will not include insurgency operations in our further analysis.

The second unsuitable category of operations is combatting terrorism. This is defined as the use of violence against noncombatants to cause widespread disorder, provoke repression by government forces, enforce obedience to the terrorist organization, or to gain publicity and recognition for the terrorist group to announce or promote its goals. Terrorism may be used by an insurgent group to show the current government's inability to protect its citizens and thereby reduce the government's credibility.(69)

Military forces can be used to combat terrorism in two ways. The first is by an antiterrorism program which includes physical security programs, intelligence-gathering operations and overall

awareness.(70) All military operations include these antiterrorist tasks, so there is no special need for a light division to conduct antiterrorist operations. The second way to combat terrorism is by counterterrorism. Military actions in counterterrorism include strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and sites.(71) In most cases, counterterrorist actions are undertaken by specially trained and organized military units such as the Counterterrorism Joint Task Force.(72) Because of the special training and organizational requirements, the light division is not suited for counterterrorist operations.

The next unsuitable operation is to rapidly accelerate or surge the level of the current assistance program to a foreign government. Military forces are usually used to support this effort because of their responsive command, control and communications infrastructure. However, most military support is in the form of military airlift or sealift support and other logistics efforts.(73) The light Infantry division is not suited for completing assistance surge operations, since it would require extensive transportation and material handling equipment augmentation in order to complete these operations.

Military units support disaster relief operations by assessing damage, moving and distributing supplies, conducting triage,

evacuating medical casualties, and establishing an emergency communications network.(74) The light division, with its strategic mobility, could rapidly move to the disaster area to quickly establish a United States presence. It also has the manpower to support the local government's labor requirements. However, besides these capabilities, the light division does not have the medical, engineer, material handling equipment, or transportation assets to assist in disaster relief, and is therefore not suited for these operations.

Rescue and recovery operations include the recovery of critical sensitive equipment or personnel and can either be opposed or unopposed. Because these are usually conducted by special forces units with special equipment and training requirements, the light division is not suited for these operations.(75)

Strikes and raids are the last type of contingency operations. These are conducted to destroy, neutralize, or seize sites or equipment that threaten the security interests of the United States or our allies. These can be conducted as part of a counterterrorism operation, counterdrug operation, or as an independent operation. A strike is conducted by land, naval or air forces with the objective of destroying, or severely damaging a high value target. It can also include taking an action to show that the United States has the capability of destroying the target if it chooses to do so at a later

time. Raids involve the rapid penetration of enemy territory to seize an objective, gather information, or destroy facilities and equipment. Both strikes and raids are usually of short duration and the forces are withdrawn after completion of the operation.(76) Because of the need for a forced-entry capability, the light division is not suited for these operations.

Based on this analysis of operations short of war, the light division is most suitable for conducting counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and noncombatant evacuation operations. In the next part of this monograph we will analyze these operations to determine their information requirements using the 25th Infantry Division's S2 Guide to a Low-Intensity Conflict. This will allow us to find which of the light infantry division's information collection organizations can best complete the division's collection requirements.

Part IV: Information Requirements and Abilities

Up to this point, this monograph defined the capabilities of the light infantry division and determined suitable low-intensity conflict operations. It is now time to analyze the division's information requirements and ability to collect this information for these operations using the modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process developed by the 25th Infantry Division

(Light) for estimating a low-intensity conflict situation. This modified IPB process is focused primarily on collecting information when the light infantry division is conducting a counterinsurgency operation.(77) However, the type of information required for counterinsurgency and noncombatant evacuation operations is similar. By further modifying information collection requirements, the process can also be used for peacekeeping operations.

The 25th Division modified the traditional IPB process by focusing on three factors that make low-intensity conflict operations different than conventional operations: the nature of the opponent or threat to the division; the importance of the local civilian population and infrastructure; and the actions taken by the allied local government and its military forces against its opposition. The resulting IPB process is composed of five phases.(78)

The first phase determines the status of the population and defines the capabilities of the threat to the division's operations. Analysis of counterinsurgency and noncombatant evacuation operations requires information on the status of the local population to place the population into groups based on their loyalty or possible threat to the local government or noncombatant evacuation. The types of information collected are tribal, ethnic or regional affiliations and possible grievances; political groups and their

agendas, and the population's known support to the insurgency or government.(79) Information is also collected on the goals, leadership, external support, and equipment of the insurgent or anti-government forces.(80) In a noncombatant evacuation, additional information is needed on the threat's purpose in harming or detaining the evacuees to see if there are possible nonmilitary solutions to preventing opposition to the evacuation operation.

The best source for collecting information for counterinsurgency or noncombatant evacuation operations is the local government.(81) However, assuming that its information is not completely correct or unbiased, the next best way for the division to gather this information is through use of the interrogation teams of the military intelligence battalion working with the local government. These teams conduct interviews, question detainees, and either confirm, deny, or clarify information provided by the local government.(82)

A third way to gather this information is from patrol or observation post reports. This information can be best obtained from the LRSD positions that have observed the same area for a long period of time without being compromised.(83) Information can also be obtained by other ground units as they report on activities in their areas of operation. Since these forces usually conduct reconnaissance missions of shorter duration than the LRSD, it is

important to remember that part of an insurgent force can be its auxiliaries. These auxiliary forces are local citizens who covertly supply, shelter and provide intelligence to the insurgents, when counterinsurgency forces are in the area.(84) A reconnaissance element may be able to pass through or observe an area at one time, but does not make it safe for travel or occupation at all times.

In a peacekeeping operation, information is collected on the forces being separated by the peacekeeping force. This includes verifying current locations for opposing combat units or political groups and determining the current ceasefire control measures, such as neutral or demilitarized zones.(85) The quickest method to collect this information is to have the belligerent forces send this information to the peacekeeping force. Once this is collected, it must be verified. However, if the belligerents do not submit the required information, then it must be collected by the division. The optimal method for verification or collecting the initial information is by aerial reconnaissance, since it can cover large areas quickly to identify the locations of the opposing forces. However, the limitations of aerial reconnaissance may require ground reconnaissance assets to complete collection. During Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama, ground cavalry troopers from the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, supported peacekeeping operations by

collecting information on forces friendly to General Noriega.(86) Because the peacekeeping force must also establish its presence in the area to help stabilize the situation, the LRSD's special ability to avoid detection may not be needed.

The second phase of the IPB process collects information on how the threat will use the available terrain. In a counterinsurgency operation, this requires information on the cover and concealment provided, as well as the area's ability to provide food, water and shelter to the insurgents.(87) Peacekeeping operations require information on the terrain's possible uses by the opposing forces. This includes covered and concealed areas, key terrain that dominates the surrounding area, key logistical facilities or resource sites, and command and control centers.(88) This phase also requires information on possible sites for use by division forces, such as assembly areas, bivouac sites, and helicopter landing zones.

There are no significant differences between collecting this type of information for conventional military operations or operations in low-intensity conflict, since the use of terrain for observation, cover and concealment, and movement remains the same. Differences may arise for specific threats based on force composition, size, types of equipment, and the threat's logistical needs, such as medical

supplies, hospitals, fuel, and the amount of rations it must maintain to support its operations.(89)

One of the best ways to gather this information is by aerial reconnaissance. As discussed earlier in the second part of this monograph, the French in Indochina, the Americans in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan found that aerial reconnaissance was invaluable for collecting information of this type. However, the limitations of aerial reconnaissance may require ground reconnaissance to complete the collection of information or verify initial reports. The ground cavalry troop's inherent mobility allows it to cover large areas, if these areas are accessible to vehicle traffic. Since an insurgent force usually bases itself in rugged terrain as a form of protection from detection by the government forces(90), the ground cavalry troop may not have enough dismounted scouts to be able to search all areas. This requires infantry patrols to complete information collection.

The third phase of the IPB process develops a graphical pattern analysis of probable threat activity based on the population and the terrain. Since this is an integration and analysis phase, there are no new requirements for collecting information.(91)

The fourth phase, determining probable threat targets, requires information on the status of roads, trails, natural or man-made

obstacles, port facilities, airports, helicopter landing areas, communications facilities, power grids, and urban areas. This includes possible locations for ambushes or observation points that the threat could use to watch these areas.(92)

Much of this information can be collected as part of phase two requirements, however more emphasis is placed on viewing the area from a threat perspective, based on the his capabilities developed in phase one. Once again, aerial reconnaissance assets are the best units available to collect this information because of their ability to cover large areas rapidly. They are hindered in completing their missions by limited visibility conditions, foliage, buildings and other forms of concealment. The use of ground units provides a method to compensate for the aerial scout's limitations, and also to view areas from the perspective of the opposing ground force. Since the threat in an insurgency is still predominately a ground based threat, using only aerial reconnaissance may give an incomplete or distorted picture.(93) The ground troop is able to conduct ground reconnaissance missions, however, the light infantry battalions may need to compensate for the troop's limited dismounted scout capability in rugged terrain or urban areas.

The last phase integrates the analysis of the threat's probable activities in order to develop actions to eliminate the threat to the

division and local government. This allows the intelligence staff to allocate assets to track and target the threat, while refining intelligence by directing assets to collect additional information on specific critical areas. However, there are no new types of information that must be collected.

Using the 25th Infantry division's modified IPB process, we find the division requires both aerial and ground reconnaissance capabilities, operating jointly, for collecting information in counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation and peacekeeping operations. A summary of information collection requirements for phase one shows the need for: the military intelligence battalion's LRSD and interrogation teams; air cavalry; and ground cavalry or infantry battalion patrols. A summary of the second and third phases' information collection requirements shows the need for air cavalry, ground cavalry, and infantry patrols to complete missions for which the ground troop does not have enough dismounted scouts.

The military intelligence battalion's LRSD is a scarce resource with special capabilities that must be focused on the division's critical requirements. It may also not be useful in establishing a presence to create stability for peacekeeping operations. The battalion's interrogation teams provide a special collection capability to the division that is duplicated in no other unit.

The soldiers from the light infantry battalions may also be used to collect information for the division, but this takes them away from completing brigade requirements. However, in areas requiring extensive dismounted patrols, the lack of a large dismounted scout element in the ground cavalry troop, may require them to do this mission.

The divisional cavalry squadron can complete most aerial and ground information collection requirements with its two air troops and one ground troop. It is mobile, already task-organized and has sufficient command, control and communications assets in its structure. The two air troops can rapidly complete the aerial reconnaissance requirements. The ground troop can compensate for the limitations of the aerial reconnaissance since its four scout platoons are able to dismount to closely check ground conditions. However, the scout platoons' small dismounted element lengthens the amount of time needed to complete reconnaissance in urban areas, mountainous regions, and heavily vegetated areas. A method to compensate for this shortfall is to augment the ground troop with an engineer platoon from the division's engineer battalion. This will not only increase the number of soldiers that are physically checking the conditions of the facilities, but also adds technical expertise to the platoons. Another way is to augment the platoons with local police or

military forces. This not only gives the platoon more manpower to conduct the mission, but also teams them with authorities that are more familiar with the area and its people.

The light infantry division can best collect information by the combined efforts of the military intelligence battalion, cavalry squadron and its nine infantry battalions.

Part V: Conclusion

The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the light infantry division needs a cavalry squadron to collect information for operations in low-intensity conflict. Only the combined collection efforts of the military intelligence battalion, cavalry squadron and infantry battalions provide the light infantry division with the necessary information. Therefore, the division needs the cavalry squadron to collect information in a low-intensity conflict.

Starting with the entry on the light divisions in FM 71-100, Division Operations, we found that the United States Army designed the light infantry division to be a strategically mobile combat force able to fight a comparable force in any type of environment. Because of this ability, it is considered the best force to employ in a low-intensity conflict.

From 1986 to 1991, the concept of low-intensity conflict has been redefined to include all operations short of war. Because of its austere organization and capabilities, the light infantry division is best suited to complete counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation, and peacekeeping operations.

The 25th Infantry Division's low-intensity conflict IPB process provides a framework to determine the division's information collection requirements in a low-intensity conflict. These requirements focus on the local population and threat, terrain in the area of operations and potential threat targets. HUMINT is currently the primary form of information available to the light infantry division when conducting operations short of war. Both aerial and ground reconnaissance assets can be used to collect information.

The division's ability to collect information is concentrated in two division-level organizations. The military intelligence battalion (CEWI) is capable of COMINT, IMINT, and HUMINT information collection. The battalion's LRSD, the best HUMINT collector in the division, is a scarce resource and must be focused on collecting the most critical information. The division cavalry squadron is capable of completing most aerial and ground HUMINT collection, with the ground troop partially compensating for the limitations of aerial reconnaissance. The squadron is limited in its ability to collect

information in urban areas, mountainous regions, and in densely vegetated areas, but this can be improved by augmenting its scout platoon crews. The light infantry battalions can collect information in rugged or urban terrain to complete missions that the cavalry cannot complete. In summary, the light infantry division requires a combination of units, including divisional cavalry, to collect information for operations in a low-intensity conflict.

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⁶¹ I participated with elements of all these divisions during TEAM SPIRIT exercises from 1986 through 1990. I was assigned to the 5th Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division (Light) during this period.

⁶² Discussion with CPT William T. Stockdale, Commander, A/5-9 Cavalry Squadron, 25th ID(L) at CAS3, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in August 1990.

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